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We assess the overall performance of our quantum key distribution (QKD) system implementing
the measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol using components with varying capabilities
such as different single photon detectors and qubit preparation hardware. We experimentally show
that superconducting nanowire single photon detectors allow QKD over a channel featuring 60 dB
loss, and QKD with more than 600 bits of secret key per second (not considering finite key effects)
over a 16 dB loss channel. This corresponds to 300 km and 80 km of standard telecommunication
fiber, respectively. We also demonstrate that the integration of our QKD system into FPGA-
based hardware (instead of state-of-the-art arbitrary waveform generators) does not impact on its
performance. Our investigation allows us to acquire an improved understanding of the trade-offs
between complexity, cost and system performance, which is required for future customization of
MDI-QKD. Given that our system can be operated outside the laboratory over deployed fiber, we
conclude that MDI-QKD is a promising approach to information-theoretic secure key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4] is the most ma-
ture application of quantum information processing – it
allows two parties (commonly known as Alice and Bob)
to exchange information-theoretic secure cryptographic
keys. During the past decade, experimental work has
focussed on the development of systems delivering secret
keys over deployed fiber at high rates [5–7], over hundreds
of kilometres [5], and in trusted-node networks [7, 8].
Furthermore, commercial systems are available for pur-
chase [9].
From a theoretical point of view, the security of QKD
is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. How-
ever, in practice, the physical devices employed in QKD
systems never perfectly agree with theoretical descrip-
tions. This disparity has led to attacks that compromise
the security of real systems [10–21]. Most importantly,
certain attacks [17, 20] known as ‘blinding attacks’, ex-
ploit vulnerabilities of single-photon detectors (SPDs) to
allow an eavesdropper to remotely control all SPDs. In
fact, the majority of successful attacks have targeted the
SPDs of QKD systems.
Protecting practical QKD systems against these ‘side-
channel’ attacks is a difficult problem, which is cur-
rently being investigated by many research groups. Some
strategies include developing counter-measures to specific
attacks [16, 22] and developing techniques to eliminate
specific weaknesses of devices [23]. However with such
approaches it is difficult to fully characterize and quan-
tify all possible weaknesses and corresponding attacks,
and it may be possible for an eavesdropper to circum-
vent the countermeasure. Another approach is to de-
velop protocols that are intrinsically secure against side-
channel attacks, such as device-independent QKD (DI-
QKD) [24, 25], in which no devices have to be trusted and
security is guaranteed via a loophole-free Bell-inequality
violation. Unfortunately, despite much effort [26, 27], a
loophole-free Bell test has yet to be achieved and the im-
plementation of DI-QKD therefore seems unlikely in near
future.
More recently, several groups have proposed QKD
protocols that are intrinsically secure against the most
dangerous side-channel attacks, namely all possible
(i.e. known or yet-to-be-proposed) detector side-
channel attacks, while requiring proper functioning
of other devices [28–32]. The first such protocol,
known as measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-
QKD) [28], was inspired by time-reversed entanglement-
based QKD [33, 34] and, for maximum secret key rate,
requires a Bell state measurement (BSM) at a cen-
tral station (henceforth referred to as Charlie) to create
entanglement-like correlations between Alice and Bob.
Note that even if an adversary completely controls the
measurement device (including the detectors) and, e.g.
replaces the entangling measurement by any other mea-
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the setup to implement the MDI-QKD protocol. The figure shows two qubit sources labeled as Bob’s
source and Alice’s source that send qubits through a quantum channel to Charlie, a third untrusted party, who performs a Bell
state measurement.
surement, he would not gain any information about the
cryptographic key. Hence, as no assumptions about the
functioning of the measurement apparatus are required,
MDI-QKD is intrinsically immune to all detector side-
channel attacks. Thus, MDI-QKD provides enhanced se-
curity as compared to traditional QKD.
The MDI-QKD protocol has other important bene-
fits. For instance, it is natural to extend the MDI-QKD
scheme to star-type network topologies, in which a large
number of users is connected to the same central sta-
tion, i.e. Charlie, who connects pairs of users on de-
mand. Such a design is more cost-effective per user than
quantum networks comprised of individual point-to-point
links [8]. Also, MDI-QKD is a natural stepping stone to-
wards quantum repeaters, which is one approach towards
truly long-distance quantum communication [35].
On the other hand, similar to the case of quan-
tum repeater-based communication, MDI-QKD faces the
challenge of BSMs with photons created by distant, and
independent, photonic qubit sources. Such a measure-
ment requires nearly complete indistinguishability of the
photons from each source upon arrival at Charlie’s, in-
cluding polarization, temporal and spectral profiles. The
latter is determined largely by local properties of the
sources and can thus be easily controlled. However, po-
larization and arrival-time fluctuate due to time-varying
properties of the entire quantum channel between the
sources and the central station, as birefringence and re-
fractive index of optical fiber are temperature dependent.
Ensuring indistinguishability thus requires feedback sys-
tems that counteract external environmental changes.
The first demonstration of a BSM with photons from
independent and widely separated sources was demon-
strated only recently [36] – explicitly for MDI-QKD.
Due to its many advantages, MDI-QKD has received
much attention from experimental groups and has been
demonstrated in several configurations. The feasibility of
MDI-QKD was first demonstrated in [36] using time-bin
encoding over up to 80 km of spooled fiber as well as
over 18.6 km of deployed fiber across a city centre, and
in [37] (using the same type of encoding) over 50 km of
spooled fiber and with random modulation of all bases
and states, as required for actual key distribution. Sub-
sequent experiments employed polarization qubits in a
lab setting with quantum signals frequency-multiplexed
with classical signals [38], and with pre-set random state
and basis modulation [39]. Most recently, MDI-QKD
has been demonstrated over 200 km of spooled optical
fiber [40], and in fully-automated fashion and over a real-
world link [41].
Our previous experiments have demonstrated the
proof-of-principle of MDI-QKD over spooled as well as
deployed fiber using a particular configuration for Alice,
Bob and Charlie [36] (in these measurements, only the
quantum channel changed). Here we assess the impact
of using components with varying capabilities – single
photon detectors and qubit-preparation hardware – on
overall system performance, i.e. secret key rates, and
maximum tolerable transmission loss. This allows us to
develop a better understanding of the trade-offs between
complexity, cost, and system performance, which is re-
quired for future customization of QKD systems.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II, we
describe the MDI-QKD protocol and in section III, a
detailed description of the realization of our MDI-QKD
system is presented. In section IV, we specify different
configurations in which our MDI-QKD system is tested
and then discuss results of these tests. We conclude in
section V.
II. THE MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
Sources of quantum states are at Alice’s and Bob’s sta-
tions. To encode classical bits, they randomly choose a
basis and a state among the four BB84 states. In the case
of time-bin qubits, these may correspond to the states |e〉
and |l〉 (i.e. eigenstates of the Pauli operator σZ , form-
ing the so-called Z-basis), or to |+〉 ≡ (|e〉+ |l〉)/√2 and
|−〉 ≡ (|e〉−|l〉)/√2 (i.e. eigenstates of the Pauli operator
σX , forming the so-called X-basis), where |e〉 and |l〉 de-
note the emission of a photon in an early or late temporal
mode, respectively. Furthermore, they associate |e〉 and
|+〉 with a classical bit value of 0, and |l〉 and |−〉 with
3a classical bit value of 1. The qubits are sent through
quantum channels to a third station at which Charlie
performs a Bell state measurement (see Figure 1) that
projects their joint state onto one of the four maximally
entangled Bell states:
|ψ±AB〉 =
1√
2
(|eAlB〉 ± |lAeB〉),
|φ±AB〉 =
1√
2
(|eAeB〉 ± |lAlB〉). (1)
Once a sufficient number of qubits has been transmit-
ted [42], Charlie announces which of his joint measure-
ments resulted in one of the four states of Eq. 1, as well
as the result of the measurement (note that to ensure
security, Charlie only needs to be able to project onto
one Bell state, but access to more Bell states will in-
crease performance). As a next step, Alice and Bob per-
form a basis reconciliation procedure known as key sift-
ing. In this step, for each successful projection onto a
Bell state, Alice and Bob reveal and compare the bases
employed to prepare their respective qubits over an au-
thenticated classical channel and keep only the events in
which they used the same basis. Next, depending on the
result of the BSM and his preparation basis, Bob must
post-process his bit values to ensure identical bit values
to Alice. For example, Bob performs a bit flip if the an-
nounced measurement resulted in |ψ−AB〉, which indicates
anti-correlated bits in both the X- as well as the Z-basis.
Furthermore, due to unavoidable experimental imperfec-
tions such as faulty qubit preparation, channel noise and
noisy single photon detectors, as well as possible eaves-
dropping, it is necessary to go through a key distilling
process: After publicly revealing a subset of their pre-
pared bit values, Alice and Bob estimate the error rate
for each basis independently, and then perform error cor-
rection on the Z-basis bits to remove all discrepancies
in their Z-keys (i.e. the key bits associated with prepa-
rations in the Z-basis). The error rate for the X-basis
is used to bound information that an eavesdropper could
have obtained during photon transmission and detection;
it is removed by means of privacy amplification. The final
secret key rate is given by:
S ≥ [Qz[1− h2(ex)]−Qzfh2(ez)] (2)
in which Q refers to the gain (the probability of a projec-
tion onto a Bell state per emitted pair of qubits), e indi-
cates error rates (the ratio of erroneous to total projec-
tions a Bell state), h2 is the binary Shannon entropy and
f refers to the efficiency of error correction with respect
to Shannon’s noisy coding theorem. The superscripts x
or z indicate to which basis a particular variable refers.
Due to the need for qubits encoded into individual pho-
tons, the above-described implementation is currently
difficult to implement. However, by taking advantage
of so-called decoy states, it is possible to use phase-
randomized weak coherent states (i.e. attenuated laser
pulses, which sometimes contain more than one photon)
[28, 42–44], which are straightforward to generate with
current technology. This is similar to traditional prepare
& measure-type protocols [45–47]. By randomly modu-
lating the mean photon number of the laser pulses be-
tween several values known as ‘signal’ and ‘decoy’ (the
optimal values of which depend on the implementation
[48, 49]), one can assess the gains and error rates associ-
ated with single-photon emissions. The secret key rate is
then given by:
S ≥ [Qz11[1− h2(ex11)]−Qzµσfh2(ezµσ)]. (3)
The ‘11’ subscript indicates values for gain and error rate
stemming from Alice and Bob both emitting a single pho-
ton, and the subscript ‘µσ’ denotes values associated with
mean photon numbers per ‘signal’ pulse of µ and σ, emit-
ted by Alice’s and Bob’s, respectively. As in Eq. 2, the
basis is indicated using a superscript.
III. REALIZATION OF OUR MDI-QKD
SYSTEM
The experimental setup of our MDI-QKD system can
be divided into four parts: qubit preparation, quantum
channel, feedback systems, and the BSM unit. We have
tested our system with various sources and single photon
detectors, and in the following subsections we present a
detailed description of each part of our system for each
of the configurations used in our MDI-QKD demonstra-
tions.
A. Qubit preparation
In our MDI-QKD system, Alice and Bob prepare time-
bin qubits in one of the four BB84 states introduced
above. In our work, time-bin qubits are prepared by
externally modulating a continuous wave (CW) laser at
1552 nm wavelength with a commercial intensity modu-
lator (IM1) and a phase modulator (PM1), as depicted
in Figure 2. The time-bin qubits in the X- and Z-basis
are prepared by providing different electronic pulses to
IM1 and PM1. By changing the attenuation of the op-
tical attenuator (ATT), different mean photon numbers
for the time-bin qubits are obtained, as required for the
decoy state protocol. In our experiments, the mean pho-
ton numbers of the signal and decoy states are optimized
through a theoretical model of MDI-QKD to obtain the
highest final key rate for each distance [49]. The phase
of the qubits is uniformly randomized by applying an
electronic signal with randomized amplitudes to PM2,
which ensures protection against the unambiguous-state-
discrimination (USD) attack [19, 21]. Note that PM2
was not included in some of the measurements described
below, and some measurements furthermore employed
only one CW laser, whose output was split and sent
to Alice and Bob for qubit preparation (deviations from
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup of our MDI-QKD system (see main text for details). LD: laser diode, PM1 and PM2: phase
modulator, IM: intensity modulator, ATT: attenuator, POC: polarization controller and measurement, AWG/SG: arbitrary
waveform generator or FPGA-based signal generator (depending on implementation), PBS: polarization beam splitter, BS:
beam splitter, SPD: single photon detector.
the generic setup depicted in Figure 2 will be mentioned
again in section IV). It is also worth noting that time-bin
qubits can also be prepared using a directly modulated
pulsed laser in conjunction with an unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer, IMs and PMs [37].
For our experiments, we use and compare two different
electronic driving devices: a commercially-available arbi-
trary waveform generator (AWG) and a home-made sig-
nal generator (SG) based on a field programmable gate
array (FPGA) and suitable drivers that transform the
FPGA outputs into appropriate analog signals. We de-
veloped our signal generator as a cost-effective and com-
pact solution to replace the AWG in anticipation of future
development of commercial MDI-QKD system. With the
AWG we generate time-bin qubits with a temporal mode
width of 100 to 500 ps and a temporal mode separation
between 1.5 and 2.5 ns. With our signal generator we
generate time-bin qubits with a temporal mode width of
290 ps and a temporal mode separation of 2.5 ns. We
characterize the time-bin qubits according to the proce-
dure described in [49]. Motivated by our setups, which
create imperfect pure states, we consider time-bin qubits
of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
1 + 2bx,z
(√
mx,z + bx,z |e〉
+ eiφ
x,z√
1−mx,z + bx,z |l〉 ). (4)
Here |e〉 and |l〉 denote orthogonal early and late tem-
poral modes, respectively. mx,z and bx,z are deter-
mined by the properties of the electronic signals from
the AWG/SG (e.g. the amplitude, and rising and falling
edges of the pulses), and the extinction ratio (ER) of
IM1. Furthermore, the superscript indicates to which
basis/state the parameter applies (e.g. mz=0 applies to
the state produces when Alice or Bob chooses the Z-basis
state |l〉). For a perfect time-bin qubit preparation setup,
mz=0,1 = 0 or 1 for qubits in the Z-basis, and mx=+,− =
0.5 for qubits in the X-basis; φx=+,− = 0 or pi for qubits
in the X-basis (in the Z-basis φz is irrelevant) and bx,z
would be zero. We measured these parameters for both
implementations; the results are given in Table I. As one
can see, the parameters barely change when moving from
an AWG to our signal generator. The impact on overall
system performance will be described in section IV B.
Parameter AWG SG
bz=0,1,x=−,+ (5.34 ± 0.91)×10−5 (2.57 ± 1.18)×10−5
mz=0 (0.986 ± 0.012) (0.982 ± 0.010)
mz=1 0 0
mx=−,+ (0.4963 ± 0.0042) (0.4963 ± 0.0062)
φz=0,1= φx=+[rad] 0 0
φx=−[rad] pi+(0.075 ± 0.015) pi+(0.075±0.015)
TABLE I. Measured values for mx,z and bx,z for time-
bin qubits prepared using an arbitrary waveform generator
(AWG) and our FPGA-based signal generator (SG), respec-
tively.
B. Quantum channel
After preparing the time-bin qubits, Alice and Bob
send them to Charlie through two different quantum
channels (i.e. optical fibers). First, we note that loss
during transmission (in conjunction with detector noise)
increases the error rate, and this limits the maximum
distance for MDI-QKD. Second, ideally, the propaga-
tion times of the photons through the fibers should re-
main constant, and the polarization state of the time-
bin qubits should not be affected. Unfortunately, both
properties change due to dynamic properties of real-world
fiber links. Figure 3 (a) shows the change of the differ-
ential arrival time of attenuated laser pulses from Alice’s
and Bob’s, which we previously reported in [36], over a
deployed fiber across the city of Calgary; Figure 3 (b) de-
picts the overlap between the polarization states of orig-
inally horizontally polarized light from Alice and Bob
after propagation to Charlie. It can be seen that both
5the differential arrival time and the overlap of the polar-
ization states vary over time and are correlated to the
outside temperature. As shown in Figure 3, the differ-
ential arrival time varies from -1.6 ns to 0.8 ns in three
hours (hours 12–15), during which the temperature in-
creases from -14 ◦C to -4 ◦C; and the polarization over-
lap can vary from 0 (orthogonally polarized pulses) to 1
(identically polarized pulses) in much less than one hour.
Hence, to realize a stable MDI-QKD system, we devel-
oped active feedback subsystems that control the prop-
agation time and polarization fluctuation, the details of
which are given in section III C.
C. Feedback systems
The main technological challenge to implement MDI-
QKD is to perform a BSM with photons from inde-
pendent sources that travelled through two indepen-
dent fibers. For this measurement, one requires the two
photons to be approximately indistinguishable, i.e, they
should have sufficient temporal, polarization, and spec-
tral overlap. To this effect, we implement different feed-
back mechanisms.
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FIG. 3. (a) Differential arrival time of attenuated laser pulses
propagation from Alice/Bob to Charlie. (b) Variation in
polarization overlap of originally horizontally polarized light
propagation from Alice/Bob to Charlie. The temperature
data (crosses) is given in the secondary y-axes, showing cor-
relation with variations of differential arrival time and polar-
ization overlap (the figure is identical to that in [36]).
1. Temporal overlap
Charlie distributes optical clock signals (at 10 MHz)
to Alice and Bob via a second optical fiber, which they
convert to electrical pulses. This master clock is used
to synchronize all relevant devices at Alice’s, Bob’s and
Charlie’s. To ensure sufficient temporal overlap, Char-
lie measures the arrival time of Alice’s and Bob’s pulses
independently every few minutes using a time-to-digital
converter (TDC) and SPDs. He then applies an appro-
priate delay to the distributed clock signal to match the
arrival time difference of signals emitted at Alice’s and
Bob’s within 30 ps.
2. Polarization overlap
Charlie sends strong vertically polarized light for 250
ms every 10 seconds through the links to Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob measure its polarization and prepare their
qubits orthogonal to that. This ensures that the qubits
from Alice and Bob, after travelling through the link,
will be identically (horizontally) polarized at Charlie and
arrive at the BS. Note that the PBSs in Charlie’s sys-
tem ensure that polarization fluctuations transform into
added loss, and not decreased indistinguishability. For
additional details see [36].
3. Spectral overlap
Alice and Bob split some of their laser light that is used
to prepare qubits and continuously send it to Charlie via
the second optical fiber. Charlie monitors the frequency
difference between the two lasers using their beat note
signal. Whenever the frequency difference is greater than
the threshold of 10 MHz, Charlie communicates the fre-
quency difference to Alice. To maintain sufficient spectral
overlap, Alice uses a frequency shifter comprising a phase
modulator to which appropriate linear phase chirps are
applied using a serrodyne modulation signal.
D. BSM unit
The BSM unit for time-bin qubits consists of a 50:50
beam splitter followed by two SPDs, as shown in Figure 2.
The two-photon projection measurement occurs by over-
lapping the two photons on the beam splitter – to erase
which-way information – and subsequently detecting the
two photons. A projection onto |ψ−AB〉 is characterized by
a coincidence detection in orthogonal temporal modes in
different detectors while a projection onto |ψ+AB〉 is char-
acterized by a coincidence detection in orthogonal tem-
poral modes in the same detector. All other coincidence
detections (i.e., detections in the same temporal mode)
project onto product states. It has been shown that the
Bell state measurement efficiency (i.e. the probability
6Configuration Lasers PM2 Qubit generation Detector Channel Total channel length Total channel loss
1 2 no AWG id201 Deployed 18.6 km 9 dB
2 2 no AWG id201 Spool 20, 40, 60 km 9.1, 13.7, 18.2 dB
3 1 yes AWG id210 Spool 60, 100 km 13.7, 20 dB
4 1 yes AWG SNSPD ATT - 16, 40, 60 dB
5 1 yes SG SNSPD ATT - 16 dB
TABLE II. MDI-QKD system configurations assessed in this work. We list the number of lasers used, the presence of PM2, the
hardware employed for qubit generation (AWG or SG), and the single photon detectors (id201, id210 or SNSPD). Quantum
channels include short fibers with attenuators (ATT), spooled fiber, and deployed fiber across the city of Calgary.
that two independent photons are projected onto an en-
tangled state) is limited to 50% when using only linear
optics and no auxiliary photons [50]. Note that we only
monitor projections onto |ψ−AB〉 for the results discussed
here, which reduces the maximum efficiency (assuming
lossless detection) to 25%. However, BSM projections
onto both |ψ−AB〉 and |ψ+AB〉 have been demonstrated [51].
The performance of the BSM unit, and in turn an MDI-
QKD system, is determined by several detector proper-
ties, including the detection efficiency ηdet, noise, gate
rate, recovery time, and detector type. For our measure-
ments, we employ three different types of detectors: two
different types of InGaAs-based SPDs from idQuantique
(id201 and id210), as well as superconducting nanowire
single photon detectors (SNSPDs) [52]. The technical
specifications are summarized in Table III. While the
SNSPDs have far superior properties, they are more cum-
bersome to use due to more stringent cooling require-
ments.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT
MDI-QKD CONFIGURATIONS –
MEASUREMENTS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We tested our system in 5 different configurations (see
Table II) and over different quantum channels, which
allows us to assess the trade-offs between system per-
formance (in terms of secret key rates or maximum
distance), complexity, and cost. The configurations
are characterized by different qubit-generation hardware
(AWG or SG), the number of lasers employed (1 or 2),
SPD id201 id210 SNSPD
Dark count probabilitya ∼10−4 ∼10−5 ∼10−7
Deadtime 10 µs 10 µs 40 ns
Maximum gate rate 8 MHz 100 MHz free running
Detector efficiency ∼15% ∼15% ∼50%
Maximum count rate 0.1 MHz 0.1 MHz 2 MHz
Afterpulsinga ∼ 10−5 ∼10−5 ∼ 0
Temperature ∼ 223 K ∼ 223 K ∼1 K
TABLE III. Properties of various SPDs we employed (aper
ns)
the presence of PM2 (used to phase-randomize the laser
pulses), and the type of SPDs (id201, id210, SNSPD).
Quantum channels are either short fibers with variable
loss (implemented using variable attenuators), spooled
fiber (without additional attenuator), or deployed fiber.
For each configuration, we created the same combina-
tion of quantum states and intensities (i.e. signal or de-
coy states) at Alice’s and Bob’s until we gathered enough
data, and then changed the states and/or the intensities
as required by the decoy state protocol described in [43].
Using Eq. 3, we then calculated the secret key rates per
gate and per second, which are shown in Figures 4 and 5,
respectively (Figure 4 additionally shows predicted val-
ues using the model described in [49]). In the following
sections we will discuss the impact of changing compo-
nents of our QKD system on its performance.
A. Quantum channels – real-world versus spooled
fibers
Configurations 1 and 2 are identical except for the
quantum channel – real-world fiber deployed across the
city of Calgary, and spooled fiber inside a temperature-
controlled laboratory, respectively (these results have al-
ready been presented in [36]). In the absence of signifi-
cant environmental effects on the deployed channel, the
corresponding secret key rates would be identical. How-
ever, as described above, the differential arrival time and
the polarization overlap vary on time-scales of less than a
minute. Hence, without properly functioning active sta-
bilization, secret key rates would be significantly reduced.
However, as one can see in Figure 4 we find nearly identi-
cal secret key rates, indicating that our feedback systems
compensate for the environmental fluctuations as well as
time-varying laser frequency differences. Note that our
feedback systems have bandwidth limitations (which we
have not yet assessed), i.e. will compensate only for suffi-
ciently slow fluctuations. This may affect the maximum
distance over which our QKD system can be employed
outside the laboratory, even if it still delivers secret key
over spooled fiber of the same length inside the lab.
7B. Qubit preparation – AWG versus FPGA-based
signal generator
Next, we compare the performance obtained with con-
figuration 4 and 5, which only differ in the hardware used
for preparing qubits – AWGs or FPGA-based signal gen-
erators (SG). Due to bandwidth differences between the
AWG and the SG, the parameters of the prepared time-
bin qubits – temporal mode width and temporal mode
separation – are insignificantly different (see Table IV).
The measured secret key rates per gate for a 16 dB loss
channel are shown in Figure 4, along with our theoreti-
cal prediction. We find very good agreement in case of
configuration 5 (SG-based qubit preparation), and rea-
sonable agreement in case of configuration 4 (AWG-based
qubit preparation). We attribute the difference mainly to
statistical fluctuations (both points overlap within their
2σ uncertainty). Hence, we find that our home-made,
cost-effective signal generator produces quantum states
of similar quality as the state-of-the-art AWG. This con-
clusion is also supported by the data in Table I.
Devices Temporal mode Temporal mode
width (FWHM) (ps) separation (ns)
AWG 250 2.50
FPGA board 290 2.50
TABLE IV. Parameters of prepared time-bin qubits for con-
figurations 4 and 5 (see Table II).
C. Impact of different single photon detectors
Configurations 1-5 differ in the single photon detectors
employed for the BSM, the quantum channel (deployed
fiber, spooled fiber and variable attenuator), the number
of lasers used to create qubits, as well as the hardware
employed for the latter. However, given that our feed-
back system operates reliably (as discussed in section
III C), and ignoring the small difference between AWG
and SG-based qubit creation (see section III A), we as-
sume in the following that all differences in secret key
rates have to be attributed to different SPDs. (Detector
performance is characterized in Table III.) From the data
shown in Figures 4 and 5, we find that the secret key rate
(in bits per gate) is significantly impacted by the use of
different detectors.
As expected, because of their superior detection effi-
ciency and lower noise, the key rate per gate for a spe-
cific amount of channel loss (i.e. distance) is higher with
SNSPDs compared to id201 and id210 InGaAs SPDs. For
the same reason, the maximum distance between Alice
and Bob is larger. More precisely, the maximum distance
over which MDI-QKD can be performed using id201 de-
tectors is 80 km. Using id210 detectors it increases to 125
km, and for SNSPDs we find 430 km (these estimations
assume fiber loss of 0.2 dB/km. Note that fibers with
FIG. 4. Experimentally obtained secret key rates per gate
versus total loss in the quantum channel. Curve A shows the
theoretical prediction assuming configuration 1 or 2, curve B
assuming configuration 3, and curve C assuming configura-
tion 4 or 5. Experimentally obtained key rates for the differ-
ent configurations are plotted as well. All configurations are
described in Table II. The secondary x-axis shows distance
assuming 0.2 dB loss per kilometre of fiber. Uncertainties
(one standard deviation) are calculated assuming Poissonian
statistics of all measured gains and error rates.
less loss are now available [53], but are probably not yet
deployed). At distances below ∼50km, the key rate per
gate when using id201 detectors is close to that of using
id210 detectors because of similar detection efficiencies
(solid and dash-dotted curves in Figure 4), but employ-
ing id210 detectors results in greater distances because
of their lower noise (refer to Table III).
It is worth noting that, as shown in Figure 5, when us-
ing SNSPDs, the secret key rate (in bits per second – not
per gate) over low-loss links is limited by the detectors’
maximum count rates, in our case around 2 MHz. To
ensure that we do not exceed this rate (in which case the
detectors would stop operating), we reduce our qubit gen-
eration rate from its maximum of 250 MHz to 20 MHz as
the quantum channel loss is reduced from 40 dB to 16 dB.
Furthermore, when using InGaAs based detectors, the fi-
nal key rate is always limited by the deadtime we set to
minimize the afterpulsing, ∼ 10 µs. Figure 5 shows the
secret key rate in bits per second when different detectors
are employed (the figure also specifies different qubit gen-
eration rates). We find the maximum key rate to be 623
Hz (obtained with SNSPDs over a total channel loss of
16 dB), and that the key rate per second is higher using
id210 detectors than with id201 detectors. This is due
to the lower noise and higher gate rates (25 MHz com-
8FIG. 5. Secret key rates per second versus loss in the quantum
channel for all configurations specified in Table II and for
different qubit generation rates. Uncertainties (one standard
deviation) are calculated assuming Poissonian statistics of all
measured gains and error rates.
pared to 2 MHz) of the id210 detectors (for more details
see [54]). Note that finite key effects were not taken into
account in calculating secret key rates [42].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In conclusion, we have tested MDI-QKD in various
configurations, differing mainly in the type of detectors
employed, the need for active feedback systems, and the
complexity and cost of the hardware used to create time-
bin qubits. We find that time-varying properties of opti-
cal fibers do not impact the system performance as they
can be compensated using simple active feedback sys-
tems, and that the system can be operated using FPGA-
based qubit creation hardware. We point out that, while
none of our configurations is a complete QKD system, our
experiments are sufficiently developed to predict the per-
formance of a full system and understand the remaining
challenges in building one. For example, there are no dif-
ficulties related to combining all features that we demon-
strated above, e.g. phase randomization of weak coher-
ent states, FPGA-based signal preparation, widely sepa-
rated locations, and efficient and low noise single photon
detection. Furthermore, implementing the decoy-state-
protocol based on quantum random number generators
(QRNGs) connected to our signal generators and drivers
would, first, neither change our results in Figure 4 nor
our conclusions, and second, is well understood [7] and
thus straightforward, albeit laborious, to do. Moreover,
the operation of high-rate QRNGs, while a challenge, has
been reported before [56–58] and is independent of the
choice of the QKD protocol. The same applies to real-
time, fast and efficient, error correction and privacy am-
plification [7]. Hence, we do not foresee any significant
challenges in creating a complete QKD system.
These findings demonstrate that MDI-QKD is already
suitable for compact and cost-effective real-world imple-
mentations, even though the protocol was proposed only
in late 2011. Furthermore, we find that secret key rates
benefit from using SNSPDs. The drawback of being
more expensive and more complex than InGaAs-based
SPDs will be largely offset in star-type quantum net-
works, where a single BSM (i.e. two SNSPDs) can serve
a large number of users. Next development steps of our
system concern the integration of true random number
generators, testing over real-world links exceeding dis-
tances of 100 km and in networks, and interfacing with
quantum repeaters [55].
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